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INTRODUCTION:
DEVELOPMENTS IN ELECTION LAW
Richard L. Hasen*
Ten years ago, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review published
a symposium on the topic "Election Law as Its Own Field of
Study."' The symposium examined whether election law deserved
to be considered its own field, wholly apart from constitutional law
and political science. In my Introduction to the symposium, I
pointed to objective indicia of independence: the course was "taught
in many fine law schools; it is the exclusive subject of two
casebooks; an Internet-based discussion group for scholars on the
subject has over 150 subscribers; and the number of law review
articles and symposia on the subject has mushroomed in the last
decade." 2
Today, no one would think to ask whether election law deserves
to be considered its own field. It is taught in many more law schools
now than it was in 1999, by many professors who were not teaching,
or were not teaching election law, in 1999; 3 election law casebooks
are now in their third and fourth editions;4 the Internet-based election
law discussion group now has over 800 participants;5 and law review
articles and symposia have continued to proliferate, along with
dedicated coverage in a peer-reviewed quarterly journal, the Election
Law Journal, now in its eighth volume. A number of election law
. William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
1. Symposium, Election Law as Its Own Field of Study, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1095 (1999).
2. Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Election Law at Puberty: Optimism and Words of
Caution, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1095-96 (1999) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Hasen,
Election Law].
3. For a current database of election law teachers, see Election Law Blog (Sept. 4, 2008,
08:00 PDT), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/01 1464.html.
4. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW
OF DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 2007); DANIEL H. LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P.
TOKAnI, ELECTION LAW-CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2008).
5. For more information on the election law listserv, see Election Law, About Election-
Law, http://mailman.lls.edu/mailman/listinfo/election-law (last visited May 29, 2009).
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blogs also have emerged,6 along with a nationally respected center
on election law at Ohio State University, Moritz College of Election
Law.7
What explains the phenomenal growth in this field? Though
many factors undoubtedly are at work, the 2000 controversy over the
presidential election in Florida, culminating in the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore,' certainly spurred
scholarly writing in the field.9 In the 1999 symposium, election law
scholars Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes rightly characterized the
field as focused on the big questions of democracy rather than as
having a "tedious focus on the narrow regulatory questions of most
interest to political junkies . *.".." 10 Dan Lowenstein similarly
remarked in the 1999 symposium that nuts-and-bolts questions of
election law had increased in number in the courts but that scholars
"do not teach these issues and we do not write about them in law
reviews; not because they are not there but because, for various
reasons, we do not find them sufficiently interesting." 11 After the
2000 Florida debacle-which saw the Supreme Court end a
presidential recount that appeared to turn on the counting of
"dimpled chads" in punch card ballots-election law scholars turned
increasingly to issues of election administration. 12 Since 2000, nuts-
6. I have posted over 12,000 items on my Election Law Blog since 2003. See Election Law
Blog, http://www.electionlawblog.org (last visited May 29, 2009). Other regular election law
bloggers include Bob Bauer, Campaign Finance Law Guide: More Soft Money Hard Law,
http://www.moresoftmoneyhardlaw.com (last visited May 29, 2009); Edward Still, Edward Still:
VoteLaw, http://www.votelaw.com (last visited May 29, 2009); Dan Tokaji, Equal Vote Blog,
http://www.moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji (last visited May 29, 2009); and Richard Winger,
Ballot Access News, http://www.ballot-access.org (last visited May 29, 2009).
7. More information about the center is available at Election Law @ Moritz,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw (last visited May 29, 2009). Ohio State Law Professor
Edward B. Foley directs the center.
8. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
9. For a review of some of the voluminous scholarly writing on the case, see Richard L.
Hasen, A Critical Guide to Bush v. Gore Scholarship, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 297 (2004).
10. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not by "Election Law" Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1173, 1174 (1999).
11. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law as a Subject: A Subjective Account, 32 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1199, 1202 (1999).
12. Among the legal scholars writing with a significant focus on election administration are
Chris Elmendorf, Heather Gerken, and Dan Tokaji, none of whom were in academia in 1999.
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and-bolts scholarship is "in," though broad election law scholarship
on democracy and the courts certainly is not "out." 13
As scholarship on election law has flourished in the last decade,
election law litigation has exploded as well. " In the pre-2000
period, state and federal courts handled an average of about ninety-
four election cases per year. As shown in figure 1 below, during the
2001-2008 period, that number has more than doubled to an average
of 237 election cases per year.
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FIGURE 1
The above figure includes both state and federal court cases. As
figure 2 below shows, in the last twelve years, state court cases made
up the majority of election challenge cases heard in the courts during
every year but one. In the period of the early 2000s, over 80 percent
of the election challenge cases were heard in state courts. The figure
has dropped somewhat, but it stood at 54 percent of cases heard in
2008. "s
13. One of the most significant pieces of scholarship this decade on the big questions of law
and democracy is Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV.
L. REv. 28 (2004).
14. The data here are drawn from my study appearing in Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy
Canon, 62 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009). The count is based upon a Lexis search of state
and federal court databases using a year restriction and "election w/p challenge," culling out cases
that are obviously inapplicable.
15. Id.
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The reasons for the litigation explosion are unclear. One theory
posits that election law has become part of a "political strategy"
followed by politicians in an effort to manipulate the rules of the
game to get elected and to win in the event of an election recount or
contest. 16 It is also possible that Bush v. Gore spurred more litigation
by creating new equal protection claims, though Charles Anthony
Smith and Christopher Shortell have found a significant rise in
litigation related to presidential elections beginning in 2000, before
Bush v. Gore. 17 Other factors may be at work as well; election
litigation might be a manifestation of the increased party polarization
in American politics. 18
The Supreme Court also continues to see its share of election
law litigation. The election litigation explosion in the Supreme
Court began in the 1960s, when the amount of litigation rose from an
average of ten cases per decade to an average of sixty cases per
16. 1 advance this theory in Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming
U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937 (2001).
17. Charles Anthony Smith & Christopher Shortell, The Suits That Counted: The
Judicialization of Presidential Elections, 6 ELECTION L.J. 251, 253 (2007).
18. Gary C. Jacobson, Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection, in
POLARIZED POLITICS: CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT IN A PARTISAN ERA 9 (Jon R. Bond &
Richard Fleisher eds., 2000).
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decade. 19 Though the number of cases the Supreme Court has
decided thus far in the first decade of the twenty-first century appears
to have declined markedly,2" along with a general decline in the
Court's caseload,21 qualitatively the Court has decided very
significant cases this decade in campaign finance, voting rights,
redistricting, and other areas.
In this Developments issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review, five law review members tackle some interesting and vexing
election law questions that have emerged from the Supreme Court's
recent election law jurisprudence. The topics here are diverse-from
statutory interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, to voter
identification issues, to the standards for redistricting, to judicial
recusal, to the constitutionality of public financing laws-but the
common thread in these studies is the difficulty of meshing theories
of democratic representation with statutory and constitutional law.
Each article uses Supreme Court and other judicial cases to enhance
the body of election law scholarship.
The Supreme Court's voting rights cases have been among its
most controversial election law decisions, and I, among others, have
expressed the view that the Roberts Court is less likely than the
Rehnquist Court to protect minority voting rights. 22 Chief Justice
19. RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW 1-2 (2003).
20. From January 2001 through January 2006, the Court decided twelve election law cases
with a written opinion. See Richard L. Hasen, No Exit?-The Roberts Court and the Future of
Election Law, 57 S.C. L. REV. 669, 672 n.26 (2006) [hereinafter Hasen, No Exit]. Since then, it
has decided fifteen more cases, including Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number
One v. Mukasey, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009); Caperton v. AT. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009); Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009); Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 129 S.
Ct. 5 (2008); Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970 (2008);
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Wash. State Grange v. Wash.
State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008); New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez
Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL I1), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007);
Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006); League of
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006);
and Wis. Right to Life v. FEC (WRTL I), 546 U.S. 410 (2006). At the time of this writing, one
election law case is pending at the Supreme Court: Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274
(D.D.C. 2008), appeal dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 1732 (2008). For more on Citizens United, see
Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance at the Supreme Court, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
m?abstractid=1436669). Still, it looks like the Court will be on track to decide only about half
as many election law cases in the first decade of this century as it has averaged in recent decades.
21. See Memorandum from Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and SCOTUSBlog.com
(June 26, 2008), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/
memo07.pdf.
22. See Hasen, No Exit, supra note 20, at 678-82.
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Roberts drew a great deal of attention when he wrote in his opinion
in a 2006 redistricting case that "[i]t is a sordid business, this
divvying us up by race."' 23  He raised more eyebrows during oral
argument in the 2008 case of Riley v. Kennedy,24 when he suggested
an interpretation of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act that would
markedly limit its coverage.25  Under this potential reading of the
Act, the only changes that "covered jurisdictions" would have to
preclear with the Department of Justice are those that differ from the
rules in effect in 1964, 1968, or 1972.26
The Supreme Court in Riley was able to avoid passing on the
Chief Justice's novel view of the Act, but Sabina Jacobs delves into
it in her Developments article, The Voting Rights Act: What Is the
Basis for the Section 5 Baseline? 27 Jacobs examines the question as a
matter of statutory interpretation. Using textual analysis, legislative
history and intent, judicial precedent, and agency interpretation,
Jacobs makes her case against Chief Justice Roberts's "static"
reading of section 5 in favor of a "dynamic baseline."28
One of the most controversial election law cases since Bush v.
Gore is the Supreme Court's 2008 opinion in Crawford v. Marion
County Election Board.29 In Crawford, the Supreme Court upheld
Indiana's requirement that voters show one of a limited number of
pieces of photographic identification before voting. 3 In As-Applied
Constitutional Challenges, Class Actions, and Other Strategies:
Potential Solutions to Challenging Voter Identification Laws After
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 3' Julien Kern takes a
close look at the likely aftermath of the Supreme Court's recent
decision. Three Justices on the Court in Crawford rejected a facial
constitutional challenge to the Indiana law but left open the
23. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring
in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
24. 128 S. Ct. 1970 (2008)
25. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26, Riley, 128 S.Ct. 1970 (2008) (No. 07-77).
26. On the mechanics of section 5 preclearance, see Sabina Jacobs, The Voting Rights Act:
What is the Basis for the Section 5 Baseline?, 42 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 575, 578, 580-82 (2009).
27. 42 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 575 (2009).
28. See id. at 580-620.
29. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
30. Id. at 1624.
31. Julien Kern, As-Applied Constitutional Challenges, Class Actions, and Other Strategies:
Potential Solutions to Challenging Voter Identification Laws after Crawford, 42 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 629 (2009).
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possibility that voters, or groups of voters, could bring an as-applied
challenge to the extent these voters could demonstrate that the laws
would impose heavy burdens on them, thereby violating their equal
protection rights. 32
Kern is skeptical that such lawsuits could successfully protect
those voters facing heavy burdens imposed on them by voter
identification laws. She finds that because of the realities of
litigation and the nature of pro bono representation, it will be
difficult for individuals to bring suits to vindicate their constitutional
rights in these cases. Class actions are no more promising, Kern
argues, because of the difficulty of creating a workable "class" of
burdened voters under the existing structure of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. She concludes that the promise of an as-applied
challenge is an empty one.
The Supreme Court has considered a number of cases involving
judicial elections, and recently considered an important one about
judicial recusal, in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.33 In The
Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judiciary,34
Molly McLucas argues that litigants should have a constitutional
right to judicial recusal in some circumstances. Under existing
Supreme Court doctrine, states may not constitutionally limit
independent spending for or against candidates for office."
Moreover, according to the Supreme Court's decision in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White,36 states cannot bar certain candidate
statements during a judicial campaign that could raise questions
about a judicial candidate's impartiality. 37 Given these two
constraints, judicial recusal appears to be one of the only ways to
ensure that individuals with cases before elected judges have a
hearing that is impartial and that has the appearance of impartiality.
Anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Caperton,3 8
McLucas argues that the Due Process Clause of the United States
32. Crawford, 128 S.Ct. at 1644 (Souter J., dissenting.)
33. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
34. Molly McLucas, The Need for Effective Recusal Standards for an Elected Judiciary, 42
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 671 (2009).
35. Id. at 695-696.
36. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
37. Id. at 788.
38. McLucas completed her initial draft before the Supreme Court's decision in Caperton.
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Constitution mandates that an elected judge recuse herself when a
litigant appearing before the judge has donated to the judge's
electoral campaign or to an independent group supporting the judge
(or opposing her opponent) in such a way as to raise reasonable
concerns about the judge's ability to remain impartial. She further
argues that objective factors must be devised to guide the judges'
evaluation of their own impartiality in such circumstances, and that
procedural protections hold more promise than the exclusive reliance
on judicial self-policing. Her suggestion of objective factors to
decide recusal issues offers courts some structure for implementing
the murky Caperton holding.
Though some of the Supreme Court's precedents in the election
law field go back decades, some fundamental questions about those
precedents remain unresolved. In Defining Population for One
Person, One Vote,39 Joshua M. Rosenberg analyzes a fascinating
question recently brought to the fore by Judge Guido Calabresi of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in his opinion
in Kalson v. Paterson." At issue is the question of implementing the
Supreme Court's requirement that states draw state legislative
districts with roughly equal populations. " Though the Court has
unequivocally set forth this one person, one vote principle, there
remains considerable controversy, as discussed in Kalson, whether
district equality requires an equality of persons or an equality of
voters in a district.42 The two will not be the same, once one
recognizes that some districts may have more persons-more
children, felons (especially if the district includes a prison), or
noncitizens-than other districts.
In Kalson, Judge Calabresi endorsed an "equal persons"
standard. " Rosenberg, drawing upon both case law and political
theory, argues that states should have the freedom to choose between
"equal persons" and "equal voters" standards in complying with the
one person, one vote rule. He contends that imposing a one-size-fits-
39. Joshua M. Rosenberg, Defining Population for One Person, One Vote, 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 709 (2009).
40. 542 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2008).
41. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
42. 542 F.3d at 284.
43. Id. at 290.
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all solution to districting violates principles of federalism by
depriving states of their ability to choose a theory of representation.
Of all doctrinal areas, campaign finance law may be the most
volatile as the Roberts Court distinguishes or overrules past
precedent. In Davis v. Federal Election Commission: Muddying the
Clean Money Landscape," Emily C. Schuman examines a potential
(intended or unintended) consequence of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Davis v. Federal Election Commission.45 In Davis, the
Court struck down a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 that allowed congressional candidates to accept larger
contributions from individuals when the candidates faced a self-
financed opponent. 46
Schuman argues that the way in which the Supreme Court struck
down the "Millionaire's Amendment" undermines a key feature of
public financing plans that have been adopted in a number of states
and cities: a trigger mechanism granting larger amounts of public
funds to candidates who participate in the plan and face large private
spending by a nonparticipating candidate or an outside group.
Schuman further argues that Davis "indicates a shift in the Court's
focus with respect to campaign finance reform, away from the
interests of the voting public and toward those of individual
candidates." 47
Together, these five articles in this Developments issue greatly
advance our understanding of the Supreme Court's past and future
election law jurisprudence. I concluded my Introduction to the 1999
symposium "Election Law as Its Own Field of Study" by proposing
that the symposium be reconvened "in ten years to see how election
law has progressed from puberty to adulthood-and perhaps to see
how we have progressed to middle age and beyond, as well." 48
Rather than focus on the bulging waistlines and receding hairlines of
the election law scholars who participated in the last symposium, I
am happier to see the baton passed here to another generation of
people who are fascinated by the intersection of law and politics, and
44. Emily C. Schuman, Davis v. Federal Election Commission: Muddying the Clean Money
Landscape, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 737 (2009).
45. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).
46. Id. at 2770.
47. Schuman, supra note 44, at 741.
48. Hasen, Election Law, supra note 2, at 1103.
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who are eager to explore how law can continue to be crafted in the
service of democracy.
